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Abstract 
Cryptocurrencies are expected to have a significant impact on banking, finance, and monetary systems. Due 
to uncertainty as to the possible future trajectories of the evolving cryptocurrency ecosystem, governments 
have taken a relatively hands-off approach to regulating such currencies. This approach may be justified 
within the theoretical information-economics framework of this paper, which draws parallels between the 
information economics of money and quasi-money creation within the current central banking, commercial 
banking and shadow banking systems with that of the cryptocurrency ecosystem. In particular, drawing 
lessons from the literature on the role of information in creating ‘safe assets’, this paper finds that by 
building on symmetric (common) knowledge as to the inner workings of the Bitcoin Blockchain - though 
in a different way - bitcoin possesses a degree of endogenous information insensitivity typical of safe assets. 
This endogenous information insensitivity could support bitcoin’s promise of maturing into a viable store 
of value and a niche medium of exchange. This finding should not be overlooked in the policy discussions 
for potential future regulatory interventions in the cryptocurrency ecosystem. 
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Introduction  
Decentralized, permissionless and blockchain-based cryptocurrencies1 and their underlying technology are 
said to have as transformative an impact on value as the invention of the internet had on information.2 The 
Bitcoin Blockchain or its so-called distributed ‘trust machine’3 has eventually solved the age-old double-
spending problem, which for decades hampered the advent of digital money for the internet. Prior to bitcoin 
(BTC), even outside the virtual space, addressing double-spending problem was delegated to trusted third 
parties with centralized ledgers, who used to verify and confirm financial transactions.  Bitcoin solved this 
problem in a secure, decentralized, consensus-based and censorship-resistant manner, without relying on 
third parties. The proof of work (PoW)4 used in the Bitcoin Blockchain, despite being energy intensive, 
appears to be a secure technique which provides a decentralized and incentive-compatible mechanism for 
verifying and confirming transactions, as well as securing the Bitcoin Blockchain.5  Although solving the 
double-spending problem has been a significant step forward in introducing bitcoin as a potential medium 
of exchange, the more challenging problem proved to be its universal acceptance. 6  As Minsky puts: 
“everyone can create money; the problem is to get it accepted”.7 As of this writing, the problem of price 
volatility has been a barrier discouraging universal adoption and has prevented bitcoin from becoming a 
reliable store of value or a potential unit of account.8 
                                                 
1 The origins of the idea of creating bitcoin-like currencies can be traced back to an article by David Chaum entitled “Security 
without Identification: Transaction Systems to make Big Brother Obsolete.”, but the idea culminated in the Nakamoto’s “Bitcoin: 
A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”. 
See: David Chaum, "Security without Identification: Transaction Systems to Make Big Brother Obsolete," Communications of the 
ACM 28, no. 10 (1985). See also: Satoshi Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System," (2008). 
2 For potential applications of blockchain technology in general, see: UK Government Office for Science, "Distributed Ledger 
Technology: Beyond Block Chain," (London: UK Government Office for Science, 2016). See also: Don Tapscott and Alex 
Tapscott, Blockchain Revolution: How the Technology Behind Bitcoin Is Changing Money, Business, and the World (New York: 
Penguin Random House LLC, 2016). 
3 The Economist, "The Promise of the Blockchain: The Trust Machine'," The Economist, Oct 31st 2015 2015.;  
4 The price volatility of bitcoin, as part of a premature asset class, should not come as a surprise. Perhaps the most difficult case to 
be made for bitcoin as a currency is the unit-of-account aspect of moneyness. As a commodity with a fixed supply schedule, the 
bitcoin would remain volatile for the foreseeable future in response to the demand shocks. Nonetheless, as will be shown in this 
paper, bitcoin price volatility has had a decreasing tend. 
5 The proof of work in principle discourages 51% attack on the network, because to hack the network, the hacker should accumulate 
substantial amounts of the coins. Having accumulated the coins and invested in the mining infrastructure, the hacker would not 
have the economic incentive to hack the system anymore. See: Josh Stark, "Making Sense of Cryptoeconomics," in Coindesk 
(August 19, 2017). See also: Katherine Heires, "The Risks and Rewards of Blockchain Technology," Risk ManagementMarch 1, 
2016.  
6 William Luther and Lawrence White, "Can Bitcoin Become a Major Currency?," JMU Working Paper in Economics No. 14-17  
(2014). 
7 Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986; repr., 2008), 255. 
8 For the unit-of-account purposes, the authors do not believe that the current decimal numbers can be a real bottleneck for bitcoin 
as it can be solved redefining the default standard for measuring bitcoin. Currently, there is one promising Bitcoin Improvement 
Proposal (BIP) for bits submitted by Jimmy Song in December 2017. It is a proposal to record BTC in ‘bits’, every bit having a 
corresponding value of one thousandth of a bitcoin (i.e., 1 bit = 100 satoshis). This proposal is known as Bits Denomination BIP. 
See: Jimmy Song, "Bits Denomination Bip," GitHub, https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0176.mediawiki.  
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Despite skepticism about the economic function of bitcoin as money or currency,9 and its earlier tarnished 
image as a useful currency for criminals (e.g., the role of bitcoin as a means of payment in Ross Ulbricht’s 
Silk Road,10 and AlphaBay),11 security threats involving bitcoin exchanges, (e.g., the failure of Mt. Gox),12 
and vulnerabilities in some of the blockchain-based organizations (the hacking of the DAO),13 as of this 
writing, the Bitcoin Blockchain has proved its resilience and likely long-term viability. 14  If 
cryptocurrencies, satisfy the critical mass constraint,15 some of them, in particular bitcoin, could potentially 
wield a significant influence on the financial and monetary systems in the long run.16 
This is not to say that bitcoin and the Bitcoin Blockchain is immune to threats. In fact, at its current form, 
bitcoin is not fully decentralized and censorship resistant, because the mining pools of bitcoin as well as 
other cryptocurrencies tend to exhibit a high level of concentration.17 Not only is this concentration harmful 
for the competitiveness of the market, but also it can compromise the overall security of the Bitcoin 
Blockchain. For example, at certain point, GHash.io mined six blocks in a row on the Bitcoin Blockchain, 
which raised significant security concerns.18 In June 2014, for a short period of time, GHash alone even 
became a 55% miner for Bitcoin.19 More recently, there has been a few successful 51% attacks to perform 
double-spend attacks on some cryptocurrencies such as Verge, Bitcoin Gold, and MonaCoin.20 
                                                 
9 David Yermack, "Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? An Economic Appraisal," National Bureau of Economic Research Working paper 
no. 19747 (2013). For the legal nature and treatment of virtual currencies, see: Noah Vardi, "Bit by Bit: Assessing the Legal Nature 
of Virtual Currencies," in Bitcoin and Mobile Payments: Constructing a European Union Framework, ed. Gabriella Gimigliano 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016).. 
10 Andy Greenberg, "Silk Road Mastermind Ross Ulbricht Convicted of All 7 Charges," WiredApril 02, 2015.. For a vivid account 
of the story of the Silk Road, see: Nick Bilton, American Kingpin: The Epic Hunt for the Criminal Mastermind Behind the Silk 
Road (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2017). 
11 When Europol shut down AlphaBay, it seized large quantities of bitcoin, Zcash, Ether and some Monero. See: Europol, "Massive 
Blow to Criminal Dark Web Activities after Globally Coordinated Operation," news release, 20 July 2017, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/massive-blow-to-criminal-dark-web-activities-after-globally-coordinated-
operation. 
12 See Lawrence Trautman, "Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now after Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox," Richmond 
Journal of Law & Technology 20, no. 4 (2013). 
13 Securities and Exchange Commission, "Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 
The Dao," (Washington, DCJuly 25, 2017). 
14 As of this writing, as listed on the coinmarketcap.com there are 1564 cryptocurrencies. The market cap of all cryptocurrencies 
on this website stands at $275,986,942,828 with BTC Dominance of 42.7%. (Accessed: 12.04.2018). See: Bitcoin obituaries: 
https://99bitcoins.com/bitcoinobituaries/  
15 Ernie G.S. Teo, "Emergence, Growth, and Sustainability of Bitcoin: The Network Economics Perspective," in Handbook of 
Digital Currency: Bitcoin, Innovation, Financial Instruments, and Big Data, ed. David Lee Kuo Chuen (San Diego, CA: Academic 
Press, 2015). 
16 See for example, Jeffrey Tucker, "Op Ed: Is There a Future for Banking in a Cryptocurrency-Dominated World?," Bitcoin 
MagazineOct. 11, 2017. 
17 For the state of affairs on decentralization see https://arewedecentralizedyet.com/) 
18  See: https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/1uk690/ghashio_just_mined_6_in_a_row_again_no_big_deal/; See also: 
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/mining-pool-centralization-crisis-levels-1389302892/). See also: handbook of digital 
currency; chapter on bitcoin mining technology 
19 (See: Ittay Eyal and Emin Gün Sirer, "How to Disincentivize Large Bitcoin Mining Pools," Hacking, Distributed  (June 18, 
2014).  
20 Cali Haan, "Verge, Bitcoin Gold and Monacoin Hacked," Crowdfund InsiderMay 25, 2018. 
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At the time of this writing, the Bitcoin Blockchain is the most decentralized network in terms of its mining 
pools. Other cryptocurrencies display higher concentration levels. As the concentration increases, the 
likelihood of collusion and 51% attack among major participants increase, posing security threats to the 
underlying blockchain. The increased concentration also increases the probability of being taken under 
central control (of governments or non-governmental entities), eventually leading to the loss of censorship-
resistance feature and even being shut down. Although game-theoretic and economic incentives embedded 
in the bitcoin network harshly punish misbehaving, such incentive mechanisms do not entirely eliminate 
such a probability.21 There has been proposals to make bitcoin mining pools more decentralized, however, 
as of this writing, none has been implemented.22 
In this paper, after a discussion on the nature of money and cryptocurrencies, we will focus on the concept 
of money and building upon the literature on information-economics of debt contracts and safe assets, we 
will argue that bitcoin can potentially be viewed as a ‘safe assets’ from this information-economics 
perspective. Although bitcoin aims at offering the functions of base money or central bank high-powered 
money23 and as such cannot be directly compared to the commercial bank money (i.e., bank-issued IOUs) 
or shadow bank money, money creation in banking and shadow banking is discussed as it is necessary for 
understanding the creation of information-insensitivity in the process of (private or public-private) money 
creation. Our main contribution lies in the insights gained from the information economics in the context 
of ‘safe assets’ and money and quasi-money creation within the shadow banking sector and their application 
to the cryptocurrency context. In particular, drawing lessons from the literature on ‘safe assets’ and building 
on Holmstrom’s seminal work (2015),24 this paper highlights certain differences in the basic information 
economics of cryptocurrencies as opposed to that of fiat currencies (including the monetary aggregates) 
that can inform policy discussions about the future regulation of cryptocurrencies. 
It is noteworthy at this very outset that informational advantage is not the only parameter that can play a 
role in transforming an asset into a money-like asset or a means of payment and settlement. There are other, 
and more important considerations in transforming an asset into money or quasi-money, such as price 
stability, lower intermediation costs, universal acceptance, technical neutrality (i.e., neutrality towards the 
type or value of the underlying transaction), instant and immediate settlement of the underlying fiduciary 
obligations and, last but not least, legal tender status and legal protections offered to the means of payments 
                                                 
21 See: Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System."; Stark, "Making Sense of Cryptoeconomics." 
22 See: Eyal and Sirer, "How to Disincentivize Large Bitcoin Mining Pools." 
23 Base money or high-powered money is the money issued by central banks and in most economies consists of coins and (central 
bank) notes. 
24 Bengt Holmstrom, "Understanding the Role of Debt in the Financial System," BIS Working Paper No 479  (2015). 
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and settlements such as ensuring settlement finality, protection from fraud, counterfeiting, and misuse.25 
For example, in addition to the information insensitivity, moneyness requires scarcity. There are many 
information insensitive objects that can become money merely because of their simple informational 
structure (e.g., a grain of sand), however, since their supply is practically infinite, they are not accepted as 
money. On the contrary, gold is a simple product in the sense that it carries no counterparty risk and has no 
underlying obligation or collateral, but it is scarce, hence it is closer to moneyness. In this example, what 
differentiates gold from a grain of sand is not its informational structure, but its scarcity. 
 
Money, bitcoin and a crisis of identity  
“Men of business in England do not...like the 
currency question. They are perplexed to define 
accurately what money is: how to count they 
know, but what to count they do not know.’26
 
On August 21, 2017, a proposal was laid out by the Managing Director at e-Residency of Estonia for issuing 
crypto tokens - called ‘estcoins’ - to its e-residents through an Initial Coin Offering (ICO).27 The idea could 
be further extended to build a sovereign wealth fund on top of such a currency.28 On September 07, 2017, 
however, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Mario Draghi rejected Estonia’s idea of issuing virtual 
currencies stating that “… no member state can introduce its own currency… The currency of the euro zone 
is the euro.”29 Developments of this kind, along with the keen interest of central bankers in studying and 
potentially issuing their own cryptocurrencies,30 have shown that cryptocurrencies can at least tangentially 
compete with fiat currencies. 
                                                 
25 Phoebus Athanassiou, "Impact of Digital Innovation on the Processing of Electronic Payments and Contracting: An Overview 
of Legal Risks," ECB Legal Working Paper Series No 16  (Octover 2017): 10-11. 
26 Walter Bagehot, "The General Aspect of the Banking Question," in The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot, ed. Norman St John 
Stevas (London: The Economist, 1857). 
27 Kaspar Korjus to E-Residency Blog, August 22, 2017, 2017, https://medium.com/e-residency-blog/estonia-could-offer-estcoins-
to-e-residents-a3a5a5d3c894.  
28 Lionel  Laurent, "The Bitcoin Sovereign Wealth Fund; Estonia Wants in on the Crypto-Currency Bubble," Bloomberg August 
25, 2017. 
29 Reuters Staff, "Ecb’s Draghi Rejects Estonia’s Virtual Currency Idea," Reuters September 7, 2017. 
30 Morten Bech and Rodney Grarratt, "Central Bank Cryptocurrencies," BIS Quarterly Review  (2017). Other central banks, such 
as Sweden’s Riksbank, are considering issuing digital currencies (e-krona in the case of Riksbank), though as of this writing, there 
is no final decision as to the issue or technical specification of e-krona. To follow this project, see: https://www.riksbank.se/en-
gb/financial-stability/the-financial-system/payments/does-sweden-need-an-e-krona/. For the pros and cons of central bank digital 
currencies, see; Max Raskin and David Yermack, "Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers, and the Future of Central Banking," 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016). 
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Although there is no single agreed-upon definition of a currency or money,31 a classic textbook definition 
comprises anything exhibiting three key features of being a store of value, a medium of exchange, and a 
unit of account.32 Based on the above definition, bitcoin, as of this writing, cannot be considered as a 
currency. 33 However, scholars of monetary history, economics and law may disagree with the classic 
textbook definition on the notion of money. In general, there are two prevailing schools of thought on 
money. On the one hand, the credit theory of money advocates a credit or debt-based monetary system,34 
by mainly emphasizing the role of money as a unit of account, or a ledger on which assets and liabilities 
are recorded. On the other hand, the commodity theory of money mainly focuses on a commodity-based 
monetary system by emphasizing the role of money as a medium of exchange or a store of value. Bitcoin 
appears to be more in line with the commodity theory of money.  
However, there is another important aspect to money relating to the role of the state, law and legal 
institutions in the definition of money, which appears to be more contentious in the contemporary thought 
on the theory of money. More specifically, as regards the role of the state in monetary systems, two 
prevailing views exist. The state theory of money, championed by Georg Knapp and Abbe Lerner, views 
legal tender status as central to moneyness.35 In contrast, the spontaneous or emergent theory of money,36 
which finds its roots in the works of Carl Menger on the origins of money,37  views universal acceptance as 
a medium of exchange as the most important criterion of moneyness.38 Friedrich Hayek, George Selgin, 
Richard Timberlake, Roland Vaubel, Lawrence White, and Leland Yeager are the most vocal theorists of 
this approach many of whom hold a free banking view and are supporters of the view that in a ‘concurrent’ 
                                                 
31 Milton Friedman, "The Island of Stone Money," The Hoover Institution Working Papers in Economics E-91-3  (1991).; See also: 
Michael F. Bryan, "Island Money," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary  (2004). There are apparently some 
differences between money and currency according to some scholars. For examples and detailed discussion of different meanings 
of money in a legal context, see: Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 7 ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012)., Chapter 1. 
32 Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money. Chapter 1. Proctor/Mann add(s) “a measure of value” or “a standard for contractual 
obligations” in the functional definition of money, however, he also views the medium of exchange function as the key feature of 
money. See also: Jack Weatherford, The History of Money: From Sandstone to Cyberspace (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 
1997), 20.; David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (Brooklyn, New York: Melville House Publishing, 2011). (Viewing money 
as a unit of account for debt.) 
33 David Yermack, "Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? An Economic Appraisal," NBER Working Paper Series 19747  (2013). 
34 A Mitchell Innes, "The Credit Theory of Money," in Credit and State Theories of Money: The Contributions of A. Mitchell Innes, 
ed. L. Randall  Wray (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2004). David Graeber (an anthropologist who provides 
significant evidence that money has emerged as a unit of account for debt. See Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years. 
35 Georg Friedrich Knapp, "The State Theory of Money," History of Economic Thought Books  (1924).; see also; Abba P. Lerner, 
"Money as a Creature of the State," The American Economic Review 37, no. 2 (1947). 
36 Some texts refer to this theory as ‘Societary Theory of Money”. See: Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money. 
37 Karl Menger, "On the Origin of Money," The Economic Journal 2, no. 6 (1892).; See also: Mikael Stenkula, "Carl Menger and 
the Network Theory of Money," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 10, no. 4 (2003). 
38 Lawrence H. White, Competition and Currency: Essays on Free Banking and Money (New York: New York University Press, 
1989), 7. 
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currency setting, good money would drive bad money out of circulation.39 Historical evidence for the claim 
that anything that is generally accepted as a medium of exchange can be considered as money abounds.40 
Lacking legal tender status, bitcoin and cryptocurrencies in general cannot be considered as money from 
the state theory of money perspective.41 It is therefore only from the point of view of the spontaneous or 
emergent theory of money that we can explore the moneyness of bitcoin.  
For bitcoin, a first hurdle to becoming money or quasi-money is its total lack of any intrinsic value. As the 
native token of the Bitcoin Blockchain, bitcoin’s value is tied to the security of its Blockchain and is partly 
a result of the trust that its users assign to that security and the fixed number of bitcoins that, by design of 
its Blockchain, can be issued. Therefore, as of today, bitcoin is being mainly held for speculative purposes. 
Yet since bitcoin is an evolving phenomenon, it is likely that through time and with emergent upgrades to 
the bitcoin protocol, such as scaling solutions (e.g., segregated witness or Segwit), second-layer solutions 
such as Lightning Network,42 and proposals for redefining the default standard for measuring bitcoin, such 
as Bits denomination BIP,43 it could evolve into a reliable store of value and possibly a medium of 
exchange.44  
However, the most difficult hurdle for bitcoin to pass will remain becoming a generally accepted unit of 
account. There is a hierarchy among the functions of money. For an asset to become a medium of exchange, 
it needs to be a store of value. And to become a unit of account, such an asset should be used as a medium 
of exchange across a variety of transactions in a given society so that it could become a means of social 
coordination.45 Indeed, for some economists, money’s function as the unit of account is the most important 
criterion in the definition of money.46 In this perspective, it is far easier for bitcoin to become a store of 
value or a medium of exchange, however, bitcoin may never become a unit of account due to its inflexible 
supply schedule that begets price volatility. In theory, the community of users could expand to a size where 
                                                 
39 Friedrich A Von Hayek, Choice in Currency: A Way to Stop Inflation (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976).; George 
Selgin, "Salvaging Gresham's Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Illegal," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 28, no. 4 (1996). 
40 See for example: Weatherford, The History of Money: From Sandstone to Cyberspace, 20. 
Perhaps the best illustration of the spontaneous theory of money can be found in Radford’s work in which he illustrates how 
cigarettes became the standard of value and currency in the Prisoner of War Camp. See: R. A. Radford, "The Economic 
Organisation of a P.O.W. Camp," Economica 12, no. 48 (1945). 
41 Although legal tender status plays an important role in giving an asset the status of money, it is not the only criterion of 
moneyness. Scottish and Northern Ireland banknotes are examples of notes that are widely used as money, but there is no legislation 
that confers legal tender status on them. See: Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, chapter 2; Parags 2.31, 2.32. 
42 Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja, "The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments,"  (2016).  
43 Song, "Bits Denomination Bip." 
44 There are improvements on Bitcoin protocol and also second layer solutions that promise to make bitcoin good for all the above-
mentioned purposes. For an overview of two such business improvements called “market exchange pricing”, and “instantaneous 
exchange facilities”, see: Luther and White, "Can Bitcoin Become a Major Currency?." See also: Song, "Bits Denomination Bip." 
45 Robleh Ali et al., "The Economics of Digital Currencies," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q3  (2014): 278-79. 
46 Michael Woodford, Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy (Pricenton: Princeton University Press, 
2003). 
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bitcoin could meet the criterion of sufficient public acceptance to serve within a given community as a 
means of exchange. However, as of this writing, the number of businesses and individuals accepting bitcoin 
as a medium of exchange is limited. 47 
Similar to the elephant-in-the-dark-room metaphor, public authorities have also taken different stances on 
the nature of cryptocurrencies. Tax authorities have designated cryptocurrencies as property.48 Commodity 
markets authorities have viewed them as commodity.49 Securities regulators have seen them as security,50 
and regulators and supervisors in charge of money or financial crime have designated them as currency. By 
the same token, legislators and regulators around the globe have attempted to define cryptocurrencies. In 
many legal and statutory texts, as well as central banking nomenclature, cryptocurrencies are often dubbed 
as virtual or digital currencies. For example, a virtual currency is defined in the § 102(23) of the U.S. 
Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Business Act (URVCBA) as a “(A) digital representation of value 
that: (1) is used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, or store of value; and (2) is not legal tender, 
whether or not denominated in legal tender”.51 The New York Bitlicense defines virtual currencies as “any 
type of digital unit that is used as a medium of exchange or a form of digitally stored value.”52 According 
to the Bitlicense,  “Virtual Currency shall be broadly construed to include digital units of exchange that (i) 
have a centralized repository or administrator; (ii) are decentralized and have no centralized repository or 
administrator; or (iii) may be created or obtained by computing or manufacturing effort.”53 The ECB defines 
virtual currencies as “a digital representation of value, not issued by a central bank, credit institution or e-
money institution, which in some circumstances can be used as an alternative to money”. 54 In ECB’s view, 
virtual currencies are not money nor currency from a legal standpoint.55 It seems that these definitions have 
been intentionally broadly constructed to include the majority of the cryptocurrencies, even if they may not 
be a store of value or a medium of exchange. 
                                                 
47 As of this writing, the number of businesses and individuals accepting bitcoin as a medium of exchange is limited.  For a map of 
bitcoin accepting venues, see: http://coinmap.org/#/map/45.54995577/10.50400257/15  
The universal acceptance in the definition of money may be understood to refer to acceptance by a given community. See: Benjamin 
Geva, "Disintermediating Electronic Payments: Digital Cash and Virtual Currencies," Journal of International Banking Law and 
Regulation 13, no. 8 (2017). 
48 See: Athanassiou, "Impact of Digital Innovation on the Processing of Electronic Payments and Contracting: An Overview of 
Legal Risks," 22-24. 
49  Commodity Futures Trading Commission, "In the Matter Of:  Coinflip, Inc., D/B/a Derivabit, and Francisco Riordan, 
Respondents: Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(C) and 6(D) of the Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings 
and Imposing Remedial Sanctions (Cftc Docket No. 15-29)," (September 17, 2015). 
50 Commission, "Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The Dao." 
51 § 102(23) of the Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Business Act (URVCBA) 
52 Section 200.2(p) Bitlicense, New York Department of Financial Services, New York Codes, Rules and Regulations; Title 23, 
Department of Financial Services, Chapter I. Regulations of the Superintendent of Financial Services, Part 200, Virtual Currencies. 
53 Ibid. 
54 European Central Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes- a Further Analysis,"  (2015): 4. 
55 Ibid. 
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From a legal perspective, cryptocurrencies should also be differentiated from electronic money (e-money).56 
E-money is always at par with fiat money. The main difference between e-money and fiat money is that e-
money is the digital representation of fiat money stored on an electronic chip.57 However, cryptocurrencies 
are self-anchored and are not pegged to any currency.58 In addition, e-money issuers should redeem the 
monetary value of the e-money at par on demand, whereas such an obligation does not exist for 
cryptocurrency developers or issuers.59 
 
 
The anonymous attribute in the customer identification section of the above table may not be accurate. As bitcoin transactions are 
mainly pseudonymous. 
In our view, apart from being a commodity money, at least three main properties of bitcoin set it apart from 
traditional central bank money: decentralization, consensus mechanism, and censorship resistance. Bitcoin 
has created an incentive-compatible ecosystem for the security and maintenance of the Bitcoin Blockchain 
                                                 
56 Sarah Rotman, "Bitcoin Versus Electronic Money," in CGAP Brief (Washington, D.C.: The Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor Brief, 23 January 2014). 
57 Article 2(2) for the E-money directive defines e-money as a monetary value represented as a claim on the issuer which is stored 
on an electronic device and accepted as a means of payment by undertakings other than the issuer. See Directive 2009/110/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the 
business of electronic money institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC, 
OJ L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7–17. 
58 Though they can be pegged to fiat currencies (e.g., USDT)  
59 Art. 11 Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit 
and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and 
repealing Directive 2000/46/EC, OJ L 267, 10.10.2009, p. 7–17. 
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leading to the creation of a denationalized and decentralized money. In this view, the idea of central bank 
cryptocurrency (CBCC),60 put forward by, among others,61 Bech and Grarratt of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), 62  which retains the issuance of money under the control of the central bank, but 
decentralizes the settlement method (peer-to-peer settlement) would seem as an oxymoron.63 This paper, 
also does not view such cryptocurrencies as true cryptocurrencies; they may best be classified as 
(centralized) digital base money with a peer-to-peer settlement mechanism. 
Alongside bitcoin, the cryptocurrency ecosystem includes a whole variety of other so-called cryptoassets. 
According to one classification, assets created using cryptography could fall under the umbrella term of 
cryptoassets.64 However, cryptoassets suffer from a crisis of identity.65 This is mainly because they differ 
widely from one another,66 and many tokens or cryptocurrencies listed in cryptocurrency exchanges may 
not meet even the minimum required criteria of moneyness. On the contrary, upon a closer scrutiny, a 
majority of digital tokens issued through ICOs can easily meet the definition of an investment contract 
(security), such as the tokens issued by the DAO.67 
Cryptoassets could be classified as digital commodities (cryptocommodities) representing raw digital 
resources, or digital tokens (cryptotokens) representing finished digital goods and services.68 Some of these 
assets can potentially become a new asset class with potential of maturing into a valuable portfolio 
                                                 
60 CBCC are also called digital base money (DBM). For a thorough analysis of the DBM as well as why, as of now, there is no 
need for introducing it, see: Yves Mersch, "Digital Base Money: An Assessment from the Ecb’s Perspective," in Speech at the 
Farewell ceremony for Pentti Hakkarainen, Deputy Governor of Suomen Pankki – Finlands Bank, Helsinki (16 January 2017).; 
"Virtual or Virtueless? The Evolution of Money in the Digital Age," in Lecture at the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions 
Forum, London (8 February 2018).;  
61  JP Koning to Moneyness: Money is best described as an adjective, not a noun, October 19, 2014, 
http://jpkoning.blogspot.lu/2014/10/fedcoin.html.; to American Institute for Economic Research, April 26, 2018, 
https://www.aier.org/article/sound-money-project/anonymous-digital-cash.; Michael D Bordo and Andrew T Levin, "Central Bank 
Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary Policy," (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017).; David Andolfatto to 
MacroMania, April 25, 2015, http://andolfatto.blogspot.lu/2015/02/fedcoin-on-desirability-of-government.html.;  
Aleksander Berentsen and Fabian Schar, "The Case for Central Bank Electronic Money and the Non-Case for Central Bank 
Cryptocurrencies," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review  (2018); John Barrdear and Michael Kumhof, "The Macroeconomics 
of Central Bank Issued Digital Currencies," Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 605  (2016). 
62 Bech and Grarratt, "Central Bank Cryptocurrencies." In their view a central bank cryptocurrency (CBCC) is “an electronic form 
of central bank money that can be exchanged in a decentralized manner known as peer-to-peer, meaning that transactions occur 
directly between the payer and the payee without the need for a central intermediary.” "Central Bank Cryptocurrencies," 56. In 
other words, in central bank cryptocurrency, the money creation leg of currency still remains to be the prerogative of governments 
(central banks) but the settlement leg is decentralized and organized in a peer-to-peer fashion. 
63  For an engaging read on the CBCC, see: JP Koning to Moneyness, October 19, 2014, 
http://jpkoning.blogspot.lu/2014/10/fedcoin.html. 
64 Chris Burniske and Jack Tatar, Cryptoassets: The Innovative Investor's Guide to Bitcoin and Beyond (New York: McGraw Hill, 
2018). 
65 For regulatory implications of the crisis of identity, see: Hadar Yoana Jabotinsky, "The Regulation of Cryptocurrencies - between 
a Currency and a Financial Product," SSRN  (2018). 
66 Bank, "Virtual Currency Schemes- a Further Analysis," 9-11. 
67 Commission, "Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The Dao." 
68 Burniske and Tatar, Cryptoassets: The Innovative Investor's Guide to Bitcoin and Beyond. Chapter 4. 
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diversification instrument.69 This paper focuses on bitcoin, which is the most well-known and the largest 
cryptocurrency in terms of market cap. Although bitcoin has been designated as a commodity, it has a 
hybrid nature, displaying the features of both commodities and currencies. Perhaps as of this writing, bitcoin 
might best be seen as a form of digital commodity money, or in Selgin’s words ‘synthetic commodity 
money’.70 Despite the focus on bitcoin, the analysis of this paper would apply, with varying degrees, to 
many other cryptocurrencies such as Litecoin (LTC), Dash (DASH), Ripple (XRP), Monero (XMR), and 
Zcash (ZEC), which exhibit features that are considerably closer to currencies or commodities than 
investment contracts (securities). 
It is important to note that the remainder of this paper has a very specific focus. It is an attempt to apply the 
lessons from the information economics within the safe asset debate in the shadow banking sector to the 
emerging world of cryptocurrencies. It is important to acknowledge that although better informational 
features are helpful and perhaps necessary for an asset that has no intrinsic value to become money, as 
previously mentioned, it takes more than transparency in information economics for an asset to become a 
safe asset, money or currency. Therefore, this paper is not and should not be considered as a full treatment 
of cryptocurrencies and their potential to become money or currency. 
Information economics: how bitcoin differs from fiat currency 
According to Perry Mehrling, under the gold standard covering mainly the 19th century, gold (the ultimate 
international means of payment), national currencies (promises to pay gold), bank deposits (promises to 
pay currency on demand), and securities (promises to pay currency or deposits during a certain period of 
time in the future) used to constitute the hierarchy of money; with gold being at the apex of the hierarchy 
and securities at the bottom.71  
                                                 
69 Aleksander Berentsen and Fabian Schär, "A Short Introduction to the World of Cryptocurrencies," Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Review 100, no. 1 (First Quarter 2018). 
70 Slegin defines synthetic commodity money as “money that lacks nonmonetary value but is nevertheless reproducible only at a 
positive and rising marginal production cost, if indeed it can be reproduced at any cost at all.” George Selgin, "Synthetic Commodity 
Money," Journal of Financial Stability 17 (2015): 95. 
71 Perry Mehrling, "The Inherent Hierarchy of Money," Social Fairness and Economics: economic essays in the spirit of Duncan 
Foley 169 (2012). 
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Source: Mehrling, P. (2012). "The inherent hierarchy of money." 
In the fiat money framework, the concept of hierarchy of money can be reconfigured based on the ‘safety’ 
or ‘information insensitivity’ of a financial instrument. In other words, another way to construct a concept 
of hierarchy in the fiat currency system is to build this concept based on the information economics of a 
particular financial instrument or asset. The most information-insensitive (the safest) assets being at the top 
of the hierarchy of money, the least information-insensitive (the riskiest) assets lying at the bottom.72 
Therefore, within this framework, the level of safety of an asset as a means of settlement would be the 
benchmark against which the concept of hierarchy is built; the source of safety being the money claims’ 
proximity to the government; i.e., the ultimate source of official liquidity and credit puts that make money 
claims information insensitive. 
One essential difference between cryptocurrencies and fiat money is that the latter is invariably the liability 
of someone, which has to be redeemed by the issuing entity. Although it is hard to establish that the central 
bank money is a debt instrument,73 the rest of the monetary aggregates (i.e., parts of the M1, M2, and M3)74 
                                                 
72 For a similar classification see: Katharina Pistor, "Moneys’ Legal Hierarchy," in Just Financial Markets? Finance in a Just 
Society, ed. Lisa Herzog (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
73  See: Nick Rowe to Worthwhile Canadian Initiative: A mainly Canadian economics blog, April 05, 2015, 2015, 
http://worthwhile.typepad.com/worthwhile_canadian_initi/2012/04/from-gold-standard-to-cpi-standard.html.; to Worthwhile 
Candadian Initiative: A mainly Canadian economics blog, March 12, 2012, 2012, 
http://worthwhile.typepad.com/worthwhile_canadian_initi/2012/03/is-modern-central-bank-money-a-liability.html. However, 
such a promise would not be considered as a binding legal contract as the central bank has theoretically unlimited discretion on 
inflating the currency. 
Some theories, such as the credit theory of money, suggest that there is no need for redeemability or convertibility. For example, 
Mitchell Innes casts significant doubt on whether redeemability has been a feature of currency even under the metallic standard. 
See: A Mitchell Innes, "What Is Money?," in Credit and State Theories of Money: The Contributions of A. Mitchell Innes, ed. L. 
Randall Wray (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2004), 36. 
74 According to the ECB’s definition monetary aggregates “comprise monetary liabilities of MFIs [monetary financial institutions] 
and central government (post office, treasury, etc.) vis-à-vis non-MFI euro area residents excluding central government. 
- M1 is the sum of currency in circulation and overnight deposits;  
- M2 is the sum of M1, deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years and deposits redeemable at notice of up to 
three months; and  
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is the liability of someone; mainly governments and banks. But bitcoin, similar to a commodity money, is 
the liability of no one. 
Whilst initially government-issued money had to be redeemed in gold or silver,75 after decoupling money 
from the precious metals, the ‘full faith and credit’ of governments replaced the convertibility of the money 
to gold or silver. Aside from granting legal tender status to fiat money, the power of the state to impose 
taxes in the future, which itself depends upon the GDP growth, is mainly what backs fiat money. In addition, 
the fact that fiat money is accepted by the government for tax purposes ensures that such a currency is good 
for the discharge of debt (and hence a store of value for future debt repayments), which ultimately facilitated 
the universal adoption of fiat money (medium of exchange).76 
In analyzing bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, the state theory of money, which presupposes that for an asset 
to become money, it needs to be given the status of legal tender, has limited application as bitcoin has not 
been granted such a status in any major jurisdiction. Therefore, for the sole purpose of the argument and 
following the spontaneous or emergent theory of money, we argue that for an asset to become a store of 
value and a potential medium of exchange, at a minimum, it needs to possess certain safety features. In 
other words, for something to become a non-state or denationalized money, it needs to first be, or perceived 
to be, a ‘safe asset’. The safe-asset property of a currency can pave the way for its universal adoption, 
especially at its start-up phase. We will explain then how safety enhancing features of assets (money and 
quasi-money) in financial and monetary systems have been at work for decades and will show why bitcoin 
cannot rely on the safety features of traditional currencies. Yet, we will also argue that from an information-
economics perspective, bitcoin presents certain safety features, which originate from the symmetric 
knowledge of economic agents or users as to its protocol and the inner workings of its underlying 
blockchain. 
Information asymmetry, adverse selection and money as a medium of exchange 
In the context of non-commodity money (e.g. fiat currency), A is willing to accept a piece of paper as a 
method of payment in anticipation that B will accept it from A, and C will accept it from A and B, ad 
infinitum. For this to happen, the settlement asset should not give rise to any adverse selection problem 
                                                 
- M3 is the sum of M2, repurchase agreements, money market fund shares/units and debt securities with a maturity of up 
to two years.” See: ECB, Monetary aggregates, available at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money_credit_banking/monetary_aggregates/html/index.en.html  
75 Though there is disagreement on this point between the proponents of the credit theory of money and those supporting commodity 
money.  
76 William J. Luther, "Getting Off the Ground: The Case of Bitcoin," AIER Sound Money Project Working Paper Series  (2018). 
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arising from the information asymmetry as to the value of the settlement asset. In other words, the asset 
should be perceived as ‘safe’ and its safety should be common knowledge. By definition, a safe asset is an 
information-insensitive asset,77 holding the promise of becoming a high-quality store of value, a medium 
of exchange and potentially a unit of account. In other words, in order for a financial instrument to become 
a store of value and a medium of exchange, it should be highly information-insensitive. This attribute of 
safe assets could contribute to its price stability in the long run.78 
Finance literature suggests that debt instruments have traditionally been superior to equity instruments in 
addressing informational problems between borrowers and lenders.79 Debt instruments not only economize 
on the cost of information collection at the contract execution stage, but also on the liquidation cost of 
collateral.80 Debt-on-debt (debt used as collateral for another debt contract) minimizes financial market 
participants’ incentives to produce private information about the ultimate payoffs.81 This makes debt the 
least information-sensitive instrument in the financial markets. In other words, “the argument for the 
optimality of debt is simply that it’s easiest to trade if you’re sure that neither party knows anything about 
the payoff on the debt.” 82  This near-information insensitivity removes adverse selection problem, 
                                                 
77 Gary Gorton, Stefan Lewellen, and Andrew Metrick, "The Safe-Asset Share," The American Economic Review 102, no. 3 (2012): 
102. 
78 The analogy to bitcoin could be made as to the underlying design of the Bitcoin Blockchain. Unlike fiat money, bitcoin as a 
commodity money, is self-anchored and its value is not pegged to any other commodity or contract. However, the trust in bitcoin, 
especially as a store of value, comes from the fact that it is based on the embedded rules or algorithms governing the Bitcoin 
Blockchain, that it is decentralized and that its monetary policy should be decided by a specific consensus mechanism. In addition, 
artificial scarcity in this ‘digital’ currency plays an important role in the moneyness of bitcoin. Therefore, the value of bitcoin 
largely originates from holding a digital unit of a means of a store of value, medium of exchange and unit of account on the Bitcoin 
Blockchain as a secure, decentralized (and intermediary-free), censorship-resistant network for digital payments. In this sense, the 
value of bitcoin deriving from the trust in the Bitcoin Blockchain would very much resemble the arguments put forward by the 
institutional theory of money which states that money is “no more than credit against an obligor, whose acceptance as a store of 
value and as a means of payment by the public is dependent on a comprehensive legal framework that ensures stable purchasing 
power, its availability even in time of banking stress and its functional capability to settle monetary obligations. It is no longer a 
chattel, but a transferable credit within an overall institutional framework.” See: Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, "An Institutional Theory 
of Money," in International Monetary and Financial Law: The Global Crisis, ed. Mario Giovanoli and Diego Devos (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 517. (paragraph 25.01) 
Some commentators view bitcoin’s self-anchored property as its principal weakness as it causes inherent instability in its value. 
See: Geva, "Disintermediating Electronic Payments: Digital Cash and Virtual Currencies." 
79 These informational advantages originate from the fact that at the contracting stage, debt instruments are an optimal instrument 
to address private information. See: David C. Nachman and Thomas H. Noe, "Optimal Design of Securities under Asymmetric 
Information," The Review of Financial Studies 7, no. 1 (1994). At this stage, if lenders screen borrowers, debt instruments can 
optimize information collection. See: Roman Inderst and Holger M. Mueller, "Informed Lending and Security Design," The Journal 
of Finance 61, no. 5 (2006). In addition, debt instruments are better positioned to address the moral hazard behavior of managers. 
Robert D. Innes, "Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting with Ex-Ante Action Choices," Journal of Economic Theory 52, no. 
1 (1990). Debt is also the least information-sensitive instruments to ex-post public information. See: Peter M. DeMarzo, Ilan 
Kremer, and Andrzej Skrzypacz, "Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design," American Economic Review 95, no. 4 
(2005). 
80 Robert M. Townsend, "Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification," Journal of Economic Theory 
21, no. 2 (1979).; See also: Oliver Hart and John Moore, "Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt*," The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 113, no. 1 (1998). 
81 Dang, Gorton, and Holmström, "Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises.". As will be explained, in the section entitled ‘price tag 
or relying on symmetric ignorance’, this can be problematic in times of crisis. 
82 Gary Gorton, "Shadow Banking," The RegionDecember 2010, 19. 
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contributes to liquidity of debt instruments, and thereby makes them a viable instrument for both market 
and funding liquidity.83 
The informational advantage of debt instruments, i.e., information insensitivity, makes them a relatively 
better instrument to be used for issuing money claims.84 This is because an information-insensitive financial 
instrument would be highly liquid and adverse-selection proof. Liquidity and adverse-selection-proof 
property of information-insensitive instruments would make them suitable for use as a medium of exchange. 
For example, aside from central bank money (which is currently the most information insensitive financial 
instrument), bank claims are effectively used as money as the prudential regulation together with 
government credit and liquidity puts (i.e., deposit insurance and lender of last resort (LOLR), respectively) 
make them information insensitive85 and a viable choice for a medium of exchange and a store of value,86 
making such claims even suitable as an ultimate settlement asset used in the operations by certain financial 
market infrastructures.87 In the absence of such government measures and protections, bank claims would 
not have been redeemable at par on demand, and would have long ceased to be money.88 
To summarize, for an asset to become a medium of exchange, the first and utmost important factor is the 
safety feature that could enhance its stability in the long run. In transactional terms, the less an asset is prone 
to adverse selection, the better it is for transactional purposes (i.e., medium of exchange). There are different 
methods to mitigate adverse selection. Since adverse selection exists because of information asymmetry, 
signaling and screening have traditionally been two main mechanisms to mitigate information asymmetry.89 
Another major way of addressing adverse selection problem is to essentially do away with information 
asymmetry by either shedding sunlight on the settlement asset so that its value would be symmetrically and 
                                                 
83 This difference in economics of information in the equity markets versus debt markets projects itself in the organization and 
structure of these two markets. Stocks markets are organized to facilitate price discovery, money markets are organized to enhance 
liquidity. And to do so, they must obviate the need for price discovery. See: Holmstrom, "Understanding the Role of Debt in the 
Financial System."  
For the difference between funding and market liquidity, see: Markus K. Brunnermeier and Lasse Heje Pedersen, "Market Liquidity 
and Funding Liquidity," The Review of Financial Studies 22, no. 6 (2009). 
84 Dang, Gorton, and Holmström, "Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises." For bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to become money, 
they need to become information insensitive. As soon as a currency becomes information sensitive, it would lose it moneyness. 
85 The core banking claims (deposits) also enjoy government (limited) credit and liquidity puts. In other words, the trust in banking 
claims - used as money - comes from the trust in the government backing such claims (trust in the prudential regulation and liquidity 
and credit puts). 
86 This is perhaps why bank are considered traditionally opaque. Indeed, the logic behind transparency in equity markets does not 
apply to money markets. See: Holmstrom, "Understanding the Role of Debt in the Financial System." 
87 Before the advent of central banking, clearing houses, by undertaking functions similar to central banks, could ensure that checks 
would trade at par by adding a layer of endogenous opacity. See Gary Gorton, "The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking," 
Yale Journal on Regulation 31, no. 3 (2013): 839.; See also Gary B. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
88 Gorton, "The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking." 
89  See for example: George A. Akerlof, "The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (1970). 
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perfectly evaluated by both parties to a transaction (i.e., creating common knowledge), or by obfuscating 
and hiding all the information so that neither party to a transaction could be able or would have incentive 
to acquire information (i.e., creating symmetric ignorance). Since an ultimate means of settlement needs to 
be the most information insensitive and completely free from the adverse selection problem, we argue that 
for such an asset (money), neither signaling nor screening would provide complete information 
insensitivity. Instead, for such an asset to best perform its function as an ultimate means of settlement, its 
value and underlying mechanisms should be either common knowledge or should not be known to any 
financial market participant at all (symmetric ignorance). In money markets, laddered safety is no safety. 
The safety feature of an asset can be enhanced either through public/government guarantees or through 
private mechanisms.90 Since bitcoin is a decentralized asset, this paper does not suggest increasing the 
safety of bitcoin as a store of value by relying on government credit or liquidity puts (if ever possible!) as 
that suggestion would defeat the very purpose of bitcoin in the first place. And since bitcoin is the first 
digital asset, pegging its price to a basket of physical commodities would be counterproductive and would 
defeat the purpose for which it is created. In what comes next, we draw analogies between safety-enhancing 
mechanisms in the current (shadow) banking system91 and in the end, compare them to the design of the 
Bitcoin Blockchain. 
How banks and shadow banks create money? 
Historically banks and shadow banks have been in the money creation business. Bills of exchange were 
used to be a remedy for the scarcity of money and soon became the money for merchants. Besides modern 
banks, whose history goes back to at least the Middle Ages, shadow banking has existed at least since the 
late 19th century, when the Bank of England initiated a program to stabilize the private bills markets by 
bailing out bill brokers.92 These brokers were not banks. However, they were accepting to convert the bills 
into money,93 an activity that would be called shadow banking today. Therefore, contrary to the public 
perception, money is far more elusive a concept than what initially appears to be, and many entities 
alongside central banks can create it. 
                                                 
90 There would be other safety enhancing mechanism such as pegging the price of a currency to the price of a basket of commodities. 
91 For a discussion of shadow banking definition and its regulation see: Hossein Nabilou and Alessio Pacces, "The Law and 
Economics of Shadow Banking," in Research Handbook in Shadow Banking, ed. Iris H. Chiu (forthcoming 2017). 
92 Perry Mehrling et al., "Bagehot Was a Shadow Banker: Shadow Banking, Central Banking, and the Future of Global Finance," 
Central Banking, and the Future of Global Finance (November 5, 2013)  (2013). Mehrling draws interesting parallels between the 
bills market of the late 19th century England and the current functioning of the shadow banking system.  
93 Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (London: H.S. King, 1873). 
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In one classification, Pozsar (2014), arguing for the introduction of a new set of monetary aggregates that 
is able to track the supply of money and money-like claims for financial economy transactions (rather than 
real-economy transactions), defines money as something that trades at par on demand. 94  He further 
classifies currency, reserves and T-bills as purely public money (public money), insured bank deposits as 
private-public money (insured money), government repos95 and Constant Net Asset Value (CNAV) share 
of government-only Money Market Funds (MMFs)96 as public-private money (public shadow money), and 
repos collateralized by credit-risky private securities, 97  CNAV shares of prime funds, and uninsured 
deposits as purely private money (private shadow money). The latter instruments lack even an indirect 
access to public liquidity and credit puts.98 In this view, four main institutions create money: central banks, 
banks, dealer banks and money market funds. A common denominator in all of the above classifications is 
the quest for safety (information-insensitivity) engineered using private mechanisms in the absence of 
public credit and liquidity puts.  
 
 
                                                 
94 Zoltan Pozsar, "Shadow Banking: The Money View," Office of Financial Research Working Paper  (2014): 7. 
95 These repos are collateralized by credit-safe public securities issued by dealers’ government bond trading desks. 
96 These shares are Backed by public assets but not by public liquidity and credit puts explicitly 
97 These private securities could include instruments such as corporate bonds, issued by dealers’ credit trading desks 
98 Pozsar, "Shadow Banking: The Money View." 
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In what follows, we study four typical mechanisms used to create money or quasi-money in the banking 
and shadow banking sector, they include: 
1. Insurance or explicit and implicit government credit and liquidity puts; for example, deposit 
insurance, LOLR, and bailouts; 
2. Collateralization (in covered bonds); 
3. Exemptions from bankruptcy laws in repos; 
4. Prudential requirements such as capital and liquidity requirements as well as portfolio restrictions 
for money-claim issuing entities.  
19 
Insurance 
There are three theories of banking as related to money creation. The ‘financial intermediation theory’ 
suggests that banks do not create money,99 the ‘fractional reserve theory’ of banking implies that although 
banks create money collectively through ‘multiple deposit expansion’ (the ‘money multiplier’), they do not 
individually create money, and the ‘credit creation theory of banking’ argues that each individual bank can 
create credit and money by granting a loan.100  
In the credit creation theory of banking, what enables (commercial) banks to create money is their monopoly 
over taking deposit and lending simultaneously without any rule requiring them to segregate clients’ 
money.101 In this view of banking, “[D]eposits are not endowments that precede loan formation; it is loans 
that create deposits.”102 Evidence from the UK suggests that banks create and allocate approximately 97% 
of the money supply.103 In the fractional reserve theory and credit creation theory of banking, commercial 
banks would also create money through fractional reserve banking model. Fractional reserve banking 
entails risks. Since banks take demand deposits and at the same time commit not to recall loans at their 
whim, they are exposed to maturity mismatch. In addition, banks often find themselves funding illiquid 
assets by liquid liabilities and thereby exposed to liquidity mismatch. In short, banks engage in maturity 
and liquidity transformation carrying significant maturity mismatch risk. A bank that undertakes levered 
liquidity and maturity transformation, which along the way creates money, would need (government) safety 
nets, such as deposit insurance104 and liquidity support.105  In other words, the fragility of levered maturity 
transformation is the reason why banks are protected by a public safety net. Since the introduction of deposit 
                                                 
99 Under the financial intermediation theory, banks create money by receiving deposits first and lending them out. In the fractional 
reserve theory, banks create money by receiving new reserves first and by lending them out. Therefore, to create money under the 
financial intermediation theory, banks have to have deposits first. 
100 Richard A. Werner, "A Lost Century in Economics: Three Theories of Banking and the Conclusive Evidence," International 
Review of Financial Analysis 46 (2016).. 
101 "How Do Banks Create Money, and Why Can Other Firms Not Do the Same? An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending 
and Deposit-Taking," International Review of Financial Analysis 36 (2014).; Werner, "A Lost Century in Economics: Three 
Theories of Banking and the Conclusive Evidence."; Richard A. Werner, "Can Banks Individually Create Money out of Nothing? 
— the Theories and the Empirical Evidence," International Review of Financial Analysis 36 (2014). 
102 . 
This is also called endogenous money theory. See Basil Moore J., Horizontalists and Verticalists: The Macroeconomics of Credit 
Money (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).; Nicholas Kaldor, "The New Monetarism," Lloyds Bank Review 97, no. 1 
(1970).. The money created in this fashion is sometimes called ‘inside money’. See Markus K Brunnermeier and Yuliy Sannikov, 
"The I Theory of Money," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 22533  (2016). 
103 Michael; McLeay, Amar Radia, and Ryland Thomas, "Money in the Modern Economy: An Introduction," Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1  (2014 Q1).; Michael;  McLeay, Amar; Radia, and Ryland  Thomas, "Money Creation in the Modern 
Economy," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1  (2014 Q1).;  
104 Deposit insurance as a means to achieve financial stability is a controversial issue. Many scholars argue that it would not overall 
protect financial stability. See: Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Edward J. Kane, "Deposit Insurance around the Globe: Where Does It 
Work?," Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 2 (2002).; Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Edward Kane, and Luc Laeven, "Deposit 
Insurance around the World: A Comprehensive Analysis and Database," Journal of Financial Stability 20 (2015). 
105 Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. Some scholars advocate extending the safety net to shadow 
banking see: Mehrling et al., "Bagehot Was a Shadow Banker: Shadow Banking, Central Banking, and the Future of Global 
Finance."; Morgan Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
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insurance, there has been almost no serious runs by depositors on the banks of the developed world.106 
Indeed, the only way banks can create money is by relying on the government safety nets. Although deposit 
insurance rests on risk-based contributions of banks to the deposit insurance funds, in the event of systemic 
risk, there is an implicit government guarantee for such funds (i.e., bailouts). The government itself relies 
on its fiscal powers (taxing) in bailouts, and its monopoly over issuing central bank money in its LOLR 
function.107  
The problem with insurance is that it often begets moral hazard, i.e., excessive money creation. It is to 
prevent such excessive money creation using public credit and liquidity puts that several restrictions and 
conditions are in place for the provision of such measures. One such proposal for imposing further 
restrictions was the structural or functional separation in the banking industry that was proposed after the 
Great Depression. The most radical of all these proposals was the narrow banking proposal for a 100% 
currency-reserve banking, the most vocal proponents of which was Henry Simons.108 This proposal, along 
with his advocacy for equity financing versus debt financing, would effectively ensure that no non-banking 
institution would be able to create quasi-money instruments or money substitutes. In short, the proponents 
of narrow banks109 call for reforms that require all deposits of customers of a bank be held at central banks 
in the form of deposits, which is equivalent to a 100% reserve requirement. This means that the amounts 
that can be redeemed at par on demand should have a 100% reserve requirement. This proposal was part of 
the proposals that came to be known as the Chicago Plan in the aftermath of the Great Depression.110 At 
the heart of the narrow banking solutions to the banking crises is the separation of banks into two parts: A 
narrow bank offering deposits, and a mutual fund or investment company in which all the risks of volatility 
in the market value of assets pass through to the investors.  
It is no surprise that such proposals resurfaced again in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) of 
2007-2009. These proposals included a wide spectrum of recommendations ranging from narrow banking 
                                                 
106 See Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007, 5. However, even in the recent global financial crisis, there were 
instances of runs on banks such as the run on the Northern Rock. 
107 It should be mentioned that governments do not enjoy a full discretion in providing such credit and liquidity puts, and in major 
jurisdictions, there are several statutory and legal restrictions on all these measures, such as state aid restrictions and restrictions on 
monetary financing. 
108 Henry C. Simons, A Positive Program for Laissez Faire, Public Policy Pamphlet No. 15 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
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initiatives,111 ring fencing,112 subsidiarization, prohibitions on proprietary trading by banking institutions 
coupled with putting limitations on their relationship with private funds.113 One could view the Volcker 
Rule and other structural reform measures, as well as Sections 23A and 23B of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
Act,114 as measures devised to curb excessive (quasi)money creation by the shadow banking sector relying 
on the government safety nets initially provided to banks.115 
Bankruptcy safe harbors 
Cash as a bearer instrument is the ultimate means of settlement. The reason for cash having such a status is 
that it bears virtually no counterparty risk. As soon as cash is tendered, the underlying fiduciary obligation 
of the buyer to the seller is instantaneously discharged (cleared and settled).116 This means that cash and 
cash settlement is bankruptcy proof and payment by cash carries no counterparty risks. Bankruptcy-proof 
nature of cash settlement helps cash become a safe and popular medium of exchange. For any other financial 
instrument that vies to become an ultimate medium of exchange and settlement, it should be, to the extent 
possible, free from counterparty risks.  
The story of the transformation of repurchase agreements (repos)117 from a traditional old-style funding 
instrument to an effective shadow-banking-sector money can illustrate how removing counterparty credit 
risk can help transform a commonplace financial instrument to money. Despite the fact that shadow banks 
cannot rely on the banks’ safety net and are susceptible to runs,118 by creating safe, short-term, and liquid 
instruments (quasi money) from risky, long-term and illiquid assets, they nevertheless responded to the 
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excess demand for safe assets. 119  A large amount of creation of these assets were conducted using 
securitization, repos, and extensive use of credit derivatives, replacing government guarantees by implicit 
or explicit private sector guarantees. 120 However, repo, which, thanks to over-collateralization (i.e., a 
haircut on the market value of the collateral) and the short maturity, provides an efficient substitute for 
demand deposits and a means of short-term market funding, stands out. Unlike bank deposits, the repos’ 
safety does not depend on the amount of the contract, therefore, they are suitable for the cash-management 
needs of institutional investors.121 
An analogy of cryptocurrencies with money markets dominated by repos can shed some light on the issue, 
as the prime driver of repos in the money markets has been the quest for safe assets. To increase the safety 
of an asset and use it as money, banks resorted to repos to provide short-term (overnight) investment 
opportunities for investment funds and, in the meantime, create an efficient source of funding and liquidity 
for themselves. Repos essentially replicated the function of demand deposits, with an additional safety due 
to its secured nature. In a short period of time, the use of repo for interbank and institutional financing 
arrangement became so popular that it effectively became the “oil in the engine of the global banking 
network” 122  and a substitute for bank deposits for institutional investors. 123  One important aspect of 
enhancing safety feature of repos lies in the repo’s preferential treatment in bankruptcy. 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code affords special treatment to Qualified Financial Contracts (QFCs) (including 
derivatives and repos) by exempting them from the ‘automatic stay’ and allowing counterparties to 
terminate these contracts (by closing out, netting or setting off their derivatives positions) and to seize the 
underlying collateral.124 The equivalent of such preferential treatment is also adopted in Europe as part of 
the Financial Collateral Directive.125 Such exemptions have substantially reduced the counterparty risks in 
repo transactions. 
Recently, after much debate about the advantages and disadvantages of the bankruptcy safe harbors, there 
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has been regulatory proposals to change the treatment of derivatives and repos in bankruptcy. For example, 
recommendations to impose a temporary stay on close-out netting for a short period of time (48h or until 
5pm of the next business day) were put forward. Such a temporary stay would allow for benefiting from 
the risk-mitigation advantage of close-out netting while preventing fire sales. However, any modification 
beyond that has not gained considerable traction.126 This proposal has already been implemented in Europe 
by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) amending the Financial Collateral Directive 
(FCD).127 
In general, removing the automatic stay exception would act as a curb on repos by reducing the liquidity of 
the collateral, particularly in tri-party markets.128 This can be viewed as a sensible regulatory measure to 
reduce the reliance on lower-quality collateral, akin to setting minimum haircuts. However, removing this 
exception would probably be unwarranted for higher-quality collateral, such as most government-
guaranteed securities.129 As the most important impact of such bankruptcy safe harbors for repo collateral 
is that they enhanced the safety of repo to be used in (interbank) financial transactions as money, removing 
such exemptions for lower quality collateral would erode the moneyness of repos and place a curb on 
(quasi)money creation by shadow banks. 
Microprudential regulation: Portfolio restrictions, leverage and liquidity requirements 
Money Market Funds (MMFs) are financial intermediaries that connect short-term debt issuers with 
providers of funds who need daily liquidity.130 Currently, CNAV MMFs are effective substitutes for insured 
deposits, and provide continuous liquidity for those institutional investors that have surplus funds and need 
daily liquidity. Since claims on MMFs are virtually redeemable at par on demand, they are money (M3). 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
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have adopted measures on the reform of the MMFs and short-term investment funds (STIFs) to address the 
risk of run on such entities.131 SEC’s reforms have so far focused on reducing risk on the asset side of 
MMFs’ balance sheet. These reforms require a minimum percentage of assets to be held in highly liquid 
securities (daily and weekly requirements), they further impose restrictions on the purchase of lower quality 
securities by MMFs. 
In addition, the SEC rules treat government MMFs (that invest at least 80% of their assets in U.S. 
government debt) and prime MMFs (that invest in corporate debt) differently. These rules require that 
government MMFs can maintain stable price per share (CNAV), but the prime MMFs should adopt the 
Variable Net Asset Value (VNAV) pricing model. To be more precise, according to the SEC’s 2014 
revisions to the regime governing MMFs, there will be three distinct categories of MMFs: retail 
(prime/municipal) MMFs, institutional (prime/municipal) MMFs, and government MMFs. Retail 
(prime/municipal) MMFs will be priced daily, at CNAV of $1.00, and will be available to natural persons 
only. Institutions, businesses, and other organizations are not eligible to invest in these types of funds. They 
are required to impose liquidity fees and or redemption gates. Institutional prime/municipal MMFs will be 
priced daily at VNAV. All categories of investors are eligible to invest in these types of funds. They are 
required to impose liquidity fees or redemption gates. And government MMFs, which will be priced daily 
at CNAV, will face no restrictions on eligible investors. These MMFs can impose redemption or liquidity 
fees and/or they can suspend all fund redemptions (aka redemption gates).132  
Similar measures were put in place in 2017 in Europe.133 The EU MMF Regulation recognizes three types 
of MMFs. VNAV MMFs, public debt CNAV MMFs and Low volatility NAV MMFs (LVNAV MMFs).134 
This regulation imposes certain levels of daily/weekly liquidity (portfolio rules) on both short-term 
MMFs135 and standard MMFs.136 The LNAV and public debt CNAV funds are required to hold at least 10% 
of their assets in instruments that mature on a daily basis137 and an additional 30% of their assets maturing 
in a week.138 These liquidity requirements are imposed to ensure that investor redemption could be satisfied 
in a timely fashion. As it is clear, the main reason behind these new regulatory developments has been to 
limit ‘private’ quasi-money creation by MMFs, while allowing such quasi-money creation for funds 
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investing in government bonds. In effect, this suggests that the ultimate source of safety of such privately-
created quasi money is the government. 
Collateralization 
An additional private innovation, which has played a major role in enhancing the safety of assets, is 
collateralization, which has reached its zenith in the production of covered bonds. Covered bonds are bonds 
(debt securities) secured by high-quality collateral. In addition to the over-collateralized cover pool, 
investors in covered bonds have an unsecured recourse against the issuer in the event of collateral deficiency 
(dual recourse). Cover-pool assets, which are ring-fenced to protect investors in the event of the bankruptcy 
of the issuer (bankruptcy remoteness of the cover pool), remain on the balance sheet of the issuer. 
Furthermore, the weak assets in the cover pool are constantly replaced by high-quality assets throughout 
the life of the bond (dynamic cover-pool).139 In addition to all of the above features, bankruptcy laws and 
regulations such as the BRRD and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) Regulation exempt covered 
bonds from its bail-in provisions, which essentially constitutes a regulatory subsidy for covered bonds.140 
All these features make covered bonds a high-yielding and attractive alternative to government securities.141 
Covered bonds are not different from securitization in essence, in the sense that they are trying to create 
safe assets using private sources of safety. Such funds, if sufficiently information insensitive, can play the 
role of money in the financial markets by becoming a safe collateral against which borrowing would be 
made possible. 
All in all, shares or bonds in money market funds, repos and to a lesser degree covered bonds can be viewed 
as quasi-money. All of the above mechanisms for money creation rely on a set of complex instruments 
enhancing information insensitivity of money created by banks and shadow banks. However, all of the 
above sources of safety and money and quasi-money creation mechanisms share a common feature in that 
they are directly or indirectly linked to governments as the ultimate credit and liquidity put providers.  
To summarize, the shadow banking sector engages in money creation by turning information-sensitive 
assets into information-insensitive ones by deploying insurance, collateralization, prudential regulation, and 
                                                 
139 Steven L. Schwarcz, "The Conundrum of Covered Bonds," The Business Lawyer  (2011): 566-67. 
140 Art. 44(2)(b) of the Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, 
and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and 
Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, 
(BRRD) & Art. 27(3)(b) of the SRM Regulation. Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment 
firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010, OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1–90,  
141 Frank Packer, Ryan Stever, and Christian Upper, "The Covered Bond Market," BIS Quarterly Review  (September 2007): 45. 
26 
preferential regulatory treatment in bankruptcy. As it is clear by now, money creation in shadow banking 
has mainly been a public-private endeavor. As we sketched the main mechanisms of the public-private 
money creation in the banking and shadow banking sector, now it is time to ask what creates safety or 
information insensitivity for central bank money, which is considered to be the safest asset in the financial 
system and the ultimate means of settlement in payment and settlement systems. 
Information asymmetry and central bank money 
Ideally, to become a ‘safe asset’ and to play a role as a medium of exchange, a debt instrument should be 
above suspicion and beyond doubt as to the value of the underlying collateral. However, no debt instrument 
is risk-free. Any financial claim, including central bank money, carries a certain degree of counterparty 
risk. Governments have managed to get around such a credit risk in an unorthodox fashion. The residual 
information insensitivity of fiat currencies has been eliminated by making all financial market participants 
‘symmetrically ignorant’ of the value of the collateral (a promise to pay). As Homlstrom puts:  
“Money itself is very opaque about the underlying collateral. No one knows what exactly 
backs up government issued money. “The full faith and credit of the government” is a very 
vague promise. But the beauty of money is that even if I do not know the exact value of the 
collateral backing my government’s promise, neither does anyone else. So we are 
“symmetrically ignorant” – a blissful state in money markets.”142 
Further studies also confirm that at least at its inception, obviating the incentive for information acquisition 
through creating symmetric ignorance played a key role in shaping central bank money. Schnabel and Shin 
(2018) discuss the evolution of trust in central banking in the context of the Kipper- und Wipperzeit (the 
clipping and culling times) crisis in the early 1600s in Germany, where due to clipping and debasement of 
coins, which resulted in the uncertainty about the true value of coins, trade was brought into a standstill. 
They show how the evolution of public deposit banks (precursors to modern central banks) helped subdue 
the crisis by the standardization of the wholesale payments through replacing cash settlement by settlement 
through bank deposits (cashless payment system). They concede that “[e]ven if the coins backing the 
deposits were of uncertain quality, such uncertainty affects all account holders equally and symmetrically. 
The fundamentals would be uncertain, but the uncertainty is common knowledge.”143 Instead of using the 
term ‘symmetric ignorance’, the authors dub the knowledge of uncertainty ‘common knowledge’, as is 
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often used in economics and finance literature. However, the better terminology for this common 
knowledge of ignorance or uncertainty would be ‘symmetric ignorance’ as used throughout this paper. 
Therefore, in contrast to the view that holds that the common knowledge in transactions has been provided 
by central banks or their predecessors (reducing or removing adverse selection problem),144 in fact, early 
banking institutions and governments have chosen a certain degree of obscurity and obfuscation to remove 
the incentives for people to acquire information about the true value of money and its underlying collateral. 
Indeed, a level of symmetric ignorance is necessary in order for the people to accept a debt instrument as a 
medium of exchange or a store of value. This symmetric ignorance removes all the incentives to acquire 
information about the underlying collateral. 
Despite its accounting treatment, i.e., banknotes and coins being recorded on the liability side of central 
banks’ balance sheets, central banks do not view central bank money as a liability.145 Therefore, central 
bank money is not considered as a debt instrument that would need an underlying collateral. However, it 
seems that even in its current form central bank money could be thought of as a ‘liability’ or promise in the 
sense that the central bank commits to certain inflation targets (price stability mandate; say below 2% annual 
inflation). Such a commitment would mean that the central bank promises to pay the holder of notes and 
coins a certain amount of the number of goods included in the basket of goods that comprises the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) or Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). In other words, the holder of the note 
can redeem the central bank money in terms of the commodities included in the CPI.146 It seems that central 
bankers are very much aware of this implicit promise embedded in fiat money. According to the ECB, fiat 
money “has no intrinsic value … yet is still accepted in exchange for goods and services because people 
trust the central bank to keep the value of money stable over time. If central banks were to fail in this 
endeavor, fiat money would lose its general acceptability as a medium of exchange and its attractiveness as 
a store of value.”147 Therefore, although viewing central bank money as an explicit promise would not be 
an accurate description, it could be viewed as an implicit promise or ‘liability’. In spite of the fact that such 
a promise would not be considered as a binding legal contract as the central bank has theoretically unlimited 
discretion on inflating the currency, it would be helpful in understanding the underlying trust in the central 
bank money and comparing such trust to the trust the bitcoin users place in bitcoin.  
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The price tag of relying on symmetric ignorance 
The safety feature arising from a secured debt contract comes with a price tag. A shock to the value of the 
underlying collateral that would cause an information-insensitive debt to become information sensitive can 
have a disruptive impact and unleash a full-fledged financial crisis.148 Such a shock would either provoke 
information acquisition, leading to adverse selection, and resulting in the likely collapse of the market for 
debt, or it would provoke no incentive for information acquisition. In the latter case, instead of information 
acquisition, market participant would only be willing to trade at a price lower than the fundamental value 
of the debt instruments, which again would lead to write-downs and fire sales. Both scenarios are likely to 
result in financial crises.149  
Compared to equity markets, money claimants respond differently from equity claimants to new 
information. Unlike equity markets where equity prices respond to new information in an incremental 
fashion, money markets often respond to new information non-linearly and in a precipitous manner.150 In 
other words, new information can lead to a collapse of trade in debt funding markets and can be a 
discontinuous event,151 creating a cliff-effect. This is perhaps why financial crises often involved debt 
markets. This has been documented in the GFC in the run on repos backed by structured securities (private 
money à la Pozsar).152 In the repo markets, due to lower appetite for liquidity and credit risks, triparty repo 
investors (mainly MMFs) often pre-emptively withdraw funding at an early stage.153 This feature of non-
central bank money - also called - institutional money, gives it a special attribute: Debt-based money 
becomes a binary, either-or phenomenon.  
However, it is hard to extend this argument to central bank money, and especially to those central banks 
with credible track record, such as the ECB, the Federal Reserve or the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The 
information insensitivity of money issued by such central banks relies on a longstanding trust in the 
institutions and the political context within which they were born and evolved. The information-economics 
perspective of non-central bank fiat money and debt contracts offers therefore only a limited insight on the 
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safety features of such central bank money. This holds less true however for such currencies that continue 
to be subject to wild fluctuations, such as Venezuelan Bolívar, Russian Ruble, Turkish Lira, Iranian Rial, 
and Argentinian Peso, as well as the extreme cases of Zimbabwean Dollar and Ecuadorian Sucre, which 
led to dollarization in the latter two countries. The binary nature of fiat money from the information 
economics approach could well be applicable to such currencies. 
Bitcoin as an evolving digital commodity money 
Most cryptocurrencies, especially bitcoin, are more akin to commodity money. Compared to debt 
instruments, a commodity has even a bumpier road to becoming money. Unlike fiat money, whose value 
depends on the full faith and credit of governments, to be viable, a commodity money, as a self-anchored 
money, needs to build consensus among its users that it is, or is perceived to be, a viable store of value or 
a medium of exchange in a coordination game.154 And arriving at such a consensus can take centuries or 
more, as was the case with gold or silver. 
In the absence of a credible obligor (i.e., a central authority, underwriter, or debtor), building consensus 
around a commodity money would require it to display certain properties to assure the users that the 
commodity money possesses certain intrinsic value or safety features in terms of information insensitivity 
so that it could get off the ground. In the absence of intrinsic value or any other stabilizing mechanism, such 
as pegging the value of the money to the price of a basket of commodities, the value (if any) of commodity 
money is prone to wild fluctuations.155 In case of bitcoin, this may be due to the increased information 
sensitivity coming from the user sentiment and fluctuations in the network value of the coin or even 
potential security vulnerabilities. Such levels of information sensitivity would be a major obstacle in the 
path to becoming an effective store of value, a viable medium of exchange, or a potential unit of account. 
Without a mechanism to ensure stability, a run would easily occur upon a discovery of additional 
information as of the value of a commodity money. In case of bitcoin, its transparency, digital nature and 
its global reach have helped it gain momentum and become a consensus-based store of value and medium 
of exchange within the bitcoin community in a relatively short time span. However, to become a long-term 
store of value or a widely accepted medium of exchange, bitcoin needs to be information insensitive.  
Nonetheless, there is a difference between information insensitivity stemming from exogenous 
shocks/information and that originating from endogenous shocks. As of this writing, bitcoin has been 
extremely sensitive to exogenous information or shocks. Even trivial positive information, such as listing 
in an exchange, has doubled or tripled its price in a relatively short time span. On the other hand, negative 
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information (such as a hack of an exchange) has also had a disproportionate negative impact on its price 
and increased its volatility by orders of magnitude unheard of in the traditional assets markets. However, 
seldom could these wild fluctuations be attributable to the endogenous shocks or information about the 
Bitcoin Blockchain itself; with a few exceptions such as the scalability debate, which occurred in November 
2017, that had a rather benign impact on its price.156  
The extreme price volatility stemming from exogenous shocks can also be a sign of the youth and 
immaturity of an asset. And it is not to say that in the future, volatility and information sensitivity of bitcoin 
cannot be mitigated by market forces. As data suggest, volatility of bitcoin has been decreasing significantly 
over time. 
 
Source: https://www.buybitcoinworldwide.com/volatility-index/  
In what follows, we argue that bitcoin possesses certain informational attributes that cannot be directly 
found in fiat money. This informational distinction of bitcoin could likely reduce bitcoin price volatility 
with orders of magnitude far smaller than what we witness today. However, this is not to say that the 
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volatility of bitcoin can easily be tamed, as it will remain relatively volatile for the foreseeable future in the 
face of demand shocks due to its inflexible supply schedule. 
Fiat money vs. bitcoin: Symmetric ignorance vs. common knowledge  
Does the information economics of debt-based money apply to a digital or synthetic commodity money 
(i.e., bitcoin)? If history is of any guidance, it suggests that commodity money is also not immune to perils 
of information economics. As for gold, its price is dependent on its scarcity. News related to the mining 
and discovery of gold would have a positive or negative impact on the price of gold. This has happened 
several times in history (e.g., California gold rush). At its extreme, a discovery of a large swath of gold 
would diminish its value as a store of value and put its moneyness at risk. However, gold itself is a self-
anchored simple product and as such its value is not dependent on many endogenous shocks. 
It appears that bitcoin has also taken a different path from that of fiat money with regard to its information 
economics. This path is very similar to that of gold. Although, unlike gold, bitcoin is a complex product, 
its high level of transparency, originating from its open-source nature, makes all endogenous information 
available to all users. Such technical transparency is at the heart of bitcoin. The issuing (how, what and 
how many), peer-to-peer nature, mining process, miners, verification and confirmation of transactions are 
all common knowledge. The functioning of bitcoin and the Bitcoin Blockchain is completely transparent 
and is laid out in Satoshi’s whitepaper.157 There is a predefined supply schedule,158 and the open ledger of 
bitcoin is out in the public eye and everyone with an internet connection has access to all the data and 
transactions being processed on the Bitcoin Blockchain. Hence, there seems to be no endogenous 
information with regard to bitcoin the revelation of which could cause a dramatic increase or a collapse in 
the value of bitcoin. Therefore, bitcoin makes no attempt to hide any information by creating endogenous 
vagueness. On the contrary, technical transparency is endogenous to bitcoin.159 By design, the transparency 
level of bitcoin is so high that it discourages any attempt by agents to acquire private information about the 
value of bitcoin, making it an adverse-selection proof instrument and a viable instrument to become a 
medium of exchange. 
Since ignorance can be turned into knowledge, but knowledge cannot be reversed back into ignorance, an 
instrument, which is built on common knowledge, has an advantage against an instrument that is built on 
                                                 
157 Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System." 
158 This supply schedule could theoretically be changed if the required consensus would be achieved, however, given the history 
of consensus building to amend the bitcoin protocol, achieving such a consensus on such a controversial issue would be close to 
impossible. 
159 However, bitcoin can be and still is vulnerable to external or exogenous information or shocks. For example, any news about 
51% attack, advances in quantum computing – which may or may not affect the bitcoin security, can cause mayhem in bitcoin 
valuation markets.  
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symmetric ignorance. Hence, bitcoin enjoys a high level of endogenous information insensitivity. This in 
turn means that bitcoin does not have to pay the price of symmetric-ignorance-based information 
insensitivity, i.e., a precipitous run. This gives bitcoin a certain edge compared to fiat money and can 
potentially transform it into a safe store of value.  
It appears that this high level of technical transparency in the Bitcoin Blockchain has been the most 
significant factor contributing to building trust among the early adopters and has paved the way to its 
incredibly fast adoption. Creating a consensus that something without a physical form has value and can be 
used as a currency without relying on trusted third parties is by far a success in itself.160 The digital nature, 
high level of security based on PoW, properties such as resistance to double spending, forge-proof, tamper-
proof and immutability, censorship resistance, pseudonymity (and anonymity), cheaper transaction cost,161 
and decentralized, distributed trust feature of bitcoin all contribute in turn to this consensus. 
As bitcoin cannot rely on the safety features of fiat money, especially not the trust and institutional backing 
of central banking, it needs to overcome this inherent weakness by building information insensitivity 
through fully sharing the information about the technical processes - protocol, blockchain, network and all 
underlying operational features of the Bitcoin Blockchain - on which it is built. The common knowledge of 
these technical features stands in contrast to the symmetric ignorance of the inner workings and backing of 
fiat money. From a pure information-economics perspective, transparency entails a higher level of 
information insensitivity than symmetric ignorance. This is not to say such technical transparency can make 
up for the absence of intrinsic value of bitcoin. Yet, it is the strongest feature on which bitcoin can rely on 
its journey to be recognized as a ‘safe asset’ or its claim to moneyness. 
Despite its informational attributes, it is highly unlikely that bitcoin would be accepted as a single base 
money within a single currency area due to its inelastic or fixed supply schedule, which removes monetary 
policy flexibility needed both in times of calm and crises and makes it volatile in the face of demand shocks. 
It is also unlikely that bitcoin would be a substitute for commercial bank money, as the latter has its own 
advantages serving various needs of a given economy. However, bitcoin could become a niche currency 
even if it will most probably never become a major parallel or concurrent currency exerting substantial 
competitive pressure on the central bank money.162 As the development of banking and shadow banking 
                                                 
160 Burniske and Tatar, Cryptoassets: The Innovative Investor's Guide to Bitcoin and Beyond. Chapter 4. 
161 Although at some point, transaction cost of bitcoin transactions soared, it came down eventually. It seems that new developments 
such as transaction batching and second layer solutions are substantially reducing transaction costs. 
162 Daniel Heller, "Do Digital Currencies Pose a Threat to Sovereign Currencies and Central Banks?," Peterson Institute for 
International Economics Policy Brief, no. BP 17-13 (April 2017); Raskin and Yermack, "Digital Currencies, Decentralized 
Ledgers, and the Future of Central Banking." 
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around bitcoin cannot be ruled out,163 bitcoin may in the future directly compete against commercial bank, 
as well as shadow banking money. 
Summary and conclusion 
Although regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have taken a passive approach to regulating 
cryptocurrencies, with the increasing popularity and potential success of cryptocurrency experiments, it is 
likely that governments would involve in regulating cryptocurrencies in the foreseeable future. This paper 
highlights certain aspects of information economics in cryptocurrency as well as fiat-money ecosystems 
that could inform future regulatory intervention in the cryptocurrency ecosystem.  
The main contribution of this paper lies in the lessons drawn from the literature on shadow banking, safe 
assets and information economics. Cryptocurrencies are not the first example of non-governmental or 
private money creation. Even within the current financial system, a large portion of monetary aggregates 
(including parts of M1, M2, and M3) consists of private or quasi-private money (e.g., bank deposits, claims 
on government and prime CNAV MMFs, etc.,). 
Shadow banking has long been in the business of quasi-money issuance, and safe-asset debate lies at the 
heart of money creation within the shadow banking system. For an asset to be safe, it needs to be 
information insensitive. The main techniques used to create information insensitive assets in the banking 
and shadow banking system have been insurance, (over)collateralization, imposing prudential requirements 
on the issuing entities, and preferential regulatory treatment of quasi-money instruments (bankruptcy safe 
harbors for repos). In all these cases, the value of an external element (e.g., collateral in repos, government 
credit and liquidity puts in deposits) removes the depositors’ or investors’ incentives to acquire information 
about the underlying debt contract, making it information insensitive.  
Although the safest asset in the financial system (i.e., central bank money) is not a debt contract in its 
current form, it can be thought of as an implicit or abstract promise. It is the full faith and credit of the 
relevant government and the credibility of the central bank that remove any incentive for participants to 
acquire information about the underlying collateral. Obviating the need for information acquisition in this 
way eventually leads to a state of blissful symmetric ignorance, in the words of Holmstrom.  
The information economics and potential information insensitivity of bitcoin relies, on the contrary, on the 
symmetric (common) knowledge of the underlying inner workings of the Bitcoin Blockchain. The 
proposition that knowledge can be attained, and ignorance can be turned into knowledge, but knowledge 
                                                 
163 Hal Finney, "Re: Bitcoin Bank," (December 30, 2010). 
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cannot be unlearned and reversed back into ignorance is central to the information insensitivity of bitcoin. 
Full technical transparency in the Bitcoin Blockchain eliminates incentives to acquire new information, 
thereby eliminating the adverse-selection problem arising from information asymmetry as to the theoretical 
value of bitcoin as a medium of exchange. This informational attribute of bitcoin can potentially help 
transform it into a potential ‘safe asset’, a store of value, and perhaps a medium of exchange. 
As previously mentioned, this paper has a narrow focus and studies bitcoin from a very specific 
microeconomic (information-economics) perspective with a special focus on the lessons drawn from the 
safe asset literature within the broader shadow banking literature. Therefore, this study should not, in and 
of itself, be viewed as a full and comprehensive treatment of safety and potential moneyness of bitcoin. 
Further future research needs to be conducted on the potential for bitcoin or similar cryptocurrencies to 
become a full-fledged safe asset. In addition to a huge future research opportunity on technical specificities 
such as miner concentration and validation and confirmation processes, special focus should be given to 
bitcoin’s price stability, supply schedule, robust legal framework for payments in cryptocurrencies, 
concerns about fungibility and immutability and the impact of the rise of cryptocurrencies on central and 
commercial banking. 
Yet, given the potential promises of bitcoin and its properties in terms of its information economics, public 
policy should allow for the organic and market-driven growth of bitcoin, which is by far one of the most 
promising experiments in the modern digital-era monetary history. Since the cryptocurrency ecosystem is 
in its infancy, a hard-touch regulatory approach can hinder the potential welfare-enhancing innovations 
coming from this ecosystem. However, this suggestion should not be mistaken for an advocacy of 
regulatory faineance, as the development of the ecosystem suffers from legal uncertainty. To the contrary, 
this approach is a defense of regulatory sobriety, data dependency, and a deference to the virtues of 
experimentation, permissionless innovation, spontaneous discovery process164 and evolutionary dynamics 
in the financial system.165 
  
                                                 
164 Israel M. Kirzner, "The Perils of Regulation: A Market-Process Approach , 119–49.," in Discovery and the Capitalist Process, 
ed. Israel M. Kirzner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
165 Simon A. Levin and Andrew W. Lo, "Opinion: A New Approach to Financial Regulation," Proceedings of the National Academy 
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